Abstract. In a previous paper, we had proved that the permutation group generated by the round functions of an AES-like cipher is primitive. Here we apply the O'Nan Scott classification of primitive groups to prove that this group is the alternating group.
Introduction
According to Shannon [Sha49, p. 657 ], a cipher "is defined abstractly as a set of transformations". Coppersmith and Grossman [CG75] , and later in 1988 Kaliski, Rivest and Sherman [KRS88] , called attention to the group generated by a cipher. One of the motivations for the work of Kaliski et al. is that at that time Triple DES was being suggested as an improvement to DES. This meant replacing the use of single DES transformation T a , where a is a key, with the composition T a T b T c , where a, b, c are three DES keys. If it was the case that the transformations of DES form a group, then Triple DES would have been of course no more than DES itself. More generally, Kaliski et al. showed that if the group generated by the transformations of a cipher is too small, then the cipher is exposed to certain cryptanalytic attacks.
It was later proved by Wernsdorf [Wer93] that the group generated by the round functions of DES (which are even permutations) is the alternating group. This implies that the group generated by the DES transformations with independent subkeys is also the alternating group. (We are not aware of any work in this context that tries to take account of the key schedule. ) Wernsdorf used ad hoc methods in [Wer02] to prove that the permutation group G generated by the round functions of AES is the alternating group. (Here, too, these functions are even permutations.) Sparr and Wernsdorf have recently given another, permutation group theoretic proof in [SW08] .
The goal of this paper is to give a different proof of this fact, building upon our earlier paper [CDVS08] . There we had proved that the group G is primitive.
In the course of doing that we answered a question of Paterson [Pat99] about the possibility of embedding a trapdoor in a cipher by having the group generated by the cipher act imprimitively.
In this paper we work under certain cryptographic assumptions (see Section 2) that are a stripped down, simplified version of those of [CDVS08] . (These are also satisfied by AES.) We first give, for the convenience of the reader, a short group-theoretic version of the main result of [CDVS08] under these assumptions. We then appeal to the O'Nan-Scott classification of primitive groups to prove that the group generated by the round functions of a cryptosystem satisfying our assumptions is the alternating group.
We are very grateful to Ralph Wernsdorf for several useful suggestions.
Preliminaries
In the rest of the paper, we tend to adopt the notation of [DR02] . Let V = V (d, 2), the vector space of dimension d over the field GF(2) with two elements, be the state (or message) space. V has n = 2 d elements. For any v ∈ V , consider the translation by v, that is the map
In particular, σ 0 is the identity map on V . The set
is an elementary abelian, regular subgroup of Sym(V ). In fact, the map
is an isomorphism of the additive group V onto the multiplicative group T . We consider a key-alternating block cipher (see Section 2.4.2 of [DR02] ) which consists of a fixed number of iterations of a function of the form ρσ k , where k ∈ V . Such a function is called a round function, and the parameter k is called the round key. (We write maps left-to-right, so ρ operates first.) Here ρ is a fixed permutation operating on the vector space V . Therefore each round consists of an application of ρ, followed by a key addition. This covers for instance AES with independent subkeys. Let G = ρσ k : k ∈ V be the group of permutations of V generated by the round functions. Choosing k = 0 we see that ρ ∈ G, and thus T ≤ G. It follows that G = T, ρ .
We assume ρ = γλ, where γ and λ are permutations. Here γ is a bricklayer transformation, consisting of a number of S-boxes. The message space V is written as a direct sum
n t > 1, where each V i has the same dimension m > 1 over GF(2). As n t > 1, this implies that d = mn t is not a prime number. For v ∈ V , we will write
where the γ i are S-boxes, which we allow to be different for each V i . λ is a linear function (usually called a linear mixing layer). The only assumption we will be making about λ is Cryptographic Assumption (3) below.
In AES the S-boxes are all equal, and consist of inversion in the field GF(2 8 ) with 2 8 elements (see later in this paragraph), followed by an affine transformation, that is, a linear transformation, followed by a translation. When interpreting AES in our scheme, we take advantage of the well-known possibility of moving the linear part of the affine transformation to the linear mixing layer, and incorporating the translation in the key addition (see for instance [MR02] ). Thus in our scheme for AES we have m = 8, we identify each V i with GF(2 8 ), and we take xγ i = x 2 8 −2 , so that γ i maps nonzero elements to their inverses, and zero to zero. As usual we will simply say that γ i acts by inversion.
We will work under the following Cryptographic Assumptions. Consider an AES-like cryptosystem as described above, which satisfies the following conditions.
(1) 0γ = 0 and γ 2 = 1, the identity transformation. (2) There is 1 ≤ r < m/2 such that the following hold.
(a) In [CDVS08] we have proved under certain abstract and general assumptions a result that specializes to the following: Theorem 1. Suppose a cryptosystem satisfies the Cryptographic Assumptions. Then the group G generated by its round functions acts primitively on the message space V .
We give a short, group-theoretic proof of this in Section 3. This we do for the convenience of the reader, as we will need to refer to part of the proof in Section 6. We are grateful to the referee of another paper for this proof.
In the rest of the paper we prove the following
Theorem 2. Suppose a cryptosystem satisfies the Cryptographic Assumptions. Then the group G generated by its round functions is the alternating group Alt(V ).
The same holds for the group generated by the cryptosystem with independent subkeys.
A word about the parity of the group G is in order here. Over V = V (d, 2), non-trivial translations are clearly involutions without fixed points, and thus even permutations. Also, for d > 2 the group GL(d, 2) = SL(d, 2) is perfect, so that in particular it has no (normal) subgroup of order 2, and it is thus contained in Alt(V ).
We now show that γ is also even, so that G ≤ Alt(V ). In fact, γ is the product of n t permutations g i , acting as γ i on V i , and as the identity on V j , j = i. This means that every 2-cycle in γ i gives rise to 2 d−m 2-cycles in g i . Now the number 2 d−m is even, as d − m = n t m − m > m, n t > 1 by assumption, and m > 2 by Cryptographic Assumption (1). It follows that each g i is even, and thus so is γ. (The same argument proves that γ is even, even without assuming that it is an involution, as we do here.)
Condition (1) is clearly satisfied by AES. As we said above, we take advantage here of the possibility of assuming that γ is simply componentwise inversion.
Condition (2a) is also well-known to be satisfied, with r = 1 (see [Nyb94] but also [DR06] ), as the image of that map has size 2 7 − 1. As to Condition (2b), it is also satisfied by AES with r = 1. For that, one could just use GAP [GAP05] to verify that the only nonzero subspaces of GF(2 8 ) which are invariant under inversion are the subfields. However, this can also be derived from a more general result of [GGSZ06] and [Mat07] , which states that the only nonzero additive subgroups of GF(2 m ), which contain the inverse of all of their nonzero elements, are the subfields.
Condition ( 
Primitivity
In this section we give a proof of Theorem 1. Suppose for a contradiction that G = T, ρ is imprimitive on V , so that any block system for G is given by the cosets of some subspace U of V . This is because, as it is proved in [CDVS08] , a block system for G is also a block system for the group T of translations. Now ρ = γλ, with λ linear, and 0γ = 0. Thus Uρ = U, and
is a subspace. Suppose firstly that U = V i 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ V i l is a direct sum of some of the subspaces V i (l < n t ). Then, U ′ = Uγ = U, so that U ′ = U is λ-invariant; this contradicts Cryptographic Assumption (3).
Thus there exists i such that U ⊇ V i , but there is u ∈ U, such that its ith component u i ∈ V i is nonzero. We claim that U ∩ V i is nonzero. Take any v ∈ V i . Then (u + v)γ + vγ ∈ U ′ , so that uγ + (u + v)γ + vγ ∈ U ′ . The latter element has all zero components, expect possibly the i-th one, which is
Were the latter zero for all v ∈ V i , then the map
thus contradicting Cryptographic Assumption (2a).
Thus there exists i such that both
proper subspaces of V i of the same dimension, and 
, which is a contradiction.
O'Nan-Scott
In this section we prove Theorem 2. We first state the O'Nan-Scott classification of primitive groups for the case of the maximal primitive subgroups of the symmetric group. We give the result for the symmetric group of degree q n , where q is a power of a prime number p. A maximal primitive subgroup G of Sym(q n ) is one of the following:
Note that in our context p = 2. It is convenient to use a refinement of the O'Nan-Scott theorem, due to Cai Heng Li [Li03] , for the special case when G contains an abelian regular subgroup T ; in our case, this is the group of translations. To prove the first statement of Theorem 2 we need to deal with the three possible cases of Theorem 4.
Case (1) is treated in Section 5. An important observation of Li [Li03] is in order here. If V is a vector space, with addition +, then the symmetric group Sym(V ) contains the affine group AGL(V ) = T GL(V ), where T is the group of translations. But Sym(V ) also contains the conjugates of AGL(V ), which are still affine groups on the set V , but possibly with respect to an operation • different from +. In particular the group T of translations may be contained in one of these conjugates, where it will be an abelian regular subgroup. We have studied this situation in [CDVS06] , and we will be exploiting these results in Section 5.
Case (2) will be dealt with in Section 6. In the almost simple case (3), the intersection of a one-point stabilizer in G with S is a proper subgroup of S of index 2 d , since the nontrivial normal subgroup S of the primitive group G is transitive. We can thus appeal (as Li does) to a particular case of a result of Guralnick [Gur83] , which states that the only nonabelian simple groups that have a subgroup of index of the form 2 d are either the alternating groups S = Alt(2 d ), with d > 2, or the groups PSL(f, q), where q is a primepower, and f is prime, (q f − 1)/(q − 1) = 2 d . We rule out the second possibility as follows.
, we have f = 2 here, and q = 2 d − 1. Well-known elementary arguments yield that q and d are prime. However, d = n t m is not prime, as n t > 1 by assumption, and as noted earlier m > 2 by Cryptographic Assumption (1).
Clearly Aut(Alt(2 d )) = Sym(2 d ) here, so G is either the alternating or the symmetric group. Since we have shown in Section 2 that G ≤ Alt(V ), we obtain G = Alt(V ).
To prove the second statement of Theorem 2, we then appeal to a standard argument: if the nonabelian simple group G is generated by a subset S, then for any fixed r the set S ′ = { s 1 s 2 . . . s r : s i ∈ S } of r-fold products of elements of S generates a nontrivial normal subgroup of G, and thus S ′ also generates G. In our context S is the set of the round functions for all possible subkeys, and r is the number of rounds, so that S ′ is the set of the transformations of the cryptosystem with independent subkeys.
The affine case
Suppose G is contained in an affine subgroup of Sym(V ). By the theory of [CDVS06] , there is a structure of an associative, commutative, nilpotent ring (V, •, ·, 0) on V , such that (V, •, 0) is a vector space over the field with two elements, and ordinary addition on V is expressed as
for x, y ∈ V . Moreover, G acts as a group of affine transformations on (V, •, 0).
As both (V, •, 0) and (V, +, 0) are elementary abelian, we have
for all x ∈ V . It follows
Here we have used the fact that · distributes over •. Now ρ ∈ G is linear with respect to •, that is (x • y)ρ = xρ • yρ for all x, y ∈ V . Choose 0 = y ∈ U = { z ∈ V : xz = 0 for all x ∈ V }. (The latter set is different from {0}, as the ring (V, •, ·, 0) is nilpotent.) Then
Now note that given x ∈ V , the set xV = { xz : z ∈ V } is a subspace with respect to •, as · distributes over •; and also a subspace with respect to +, as xz 1 + xz 2 = xz 1 • xz 2 • x 2 z 1 z 2 = xz 1 • xz 2 . It follows from 5.1 that for 0 = y ∈ U we have
The right hand side is a coset of a subspace of V with respect to +. Now λ (and its inverse) are linear with respect to +. Applying λ −1 we obtain that
is also a coset of a subspace of V with respect to +. Choose an index i so that the component y i ∈ V i of y is nonzero. Then we have that the projection on V i of the previous set
is a coset of a subspace of V i with respect to +. This contradicts Cryptographic Assumption (2a).
Wreath product in product action
Here we deal to the case when
with 2 d = k r for some k and r > 1. Here T = T 1 × · · · × T r , where
, and P permutes transitively the S i by conjugation. It follows that S 1 × · · · × S r = Soc(G).
Note that if k = 2 or 4, so that S i ∼ = Alt(2) or Alt(4), the group T of translations is normal in G, so that G ≤ AGL(V ). This contradicts the non-linearity of γ, which follows from Cryptographic Assumption (2a). Thus we will assume k > 4 in the rest of this section.
Note that G = T, ρ , and T ≤ Soc(G), so that G/ Soc(G) is cyclic, spanned by ρ. Since P permutes transitively the S i , it follows that ρ permutes cyclically the S i by conjugation, that is, we may rename indices so that S ρ i = ρ −1 S i ρ = S i+1 for each i (and indices are taken modulo r).
Since each T i is a group of translations, W i = 0T i ⊆ 0S i is a subspace of V , of order k. Since 0S i has also order k, 0T i = 0S i . Clearly each element of v ∈ V can be written uniquely in the form v = 0t, for t ∈ T . Thus v = 0t 1 t 2 . . . t r = 0t 1 + 0t 2 + · · · + 0t r for unique t i ∈ T i , and
For each i we have also W i ρ = 0S i ρ = 0S
, as 0ρ = 0. Thus ρ permutes cyclically the W i . Now let v ∈ V , and write it as v = w 1 + · · · + w r where w i ∈ W i . Let t i ∈ W i be such that w i = 0t i . Since the t i are translations, we have v = 0t 1 + 0t 2 + · · · + 0t r = 0t 1 t 2 . . . t r . We have vρ = 0t 1 t 2 . . . t r ρ = 0t Now ρ = γλ, where λ is linear. Applying λ −1 to both sides of (6.1) we get (v + u)γ + vγ ∈ W i+1 λ −1 . In other words, there are subspaces W i , W i+1 λ −1 of V of the same dimension such that when the input difference to γ is in the first one, then the output difference is in second one. By the arguments of Section 3 (with U = W i and U ′ = W i+1 λ −1 ), it follows that W i is the direct sum of some of the V j , for each i. Thus W 2 = W 1 ρ = W 1 λ and W 3 = W 2 λ, contradicting Cryptographic Assumption (3).
